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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BEATRICE RACKHAM, 
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 7453 
CLARENCE RACKHA1vt:, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiff and appellant 
against the defendant and respondent to dissolve the bonds 
of matrimony existing between said parties, to determine 
the custody of the three minor children, Barbara, Charus and 
Charlby, and to arrive at a property settlement. The appellant 
charged acts of physical and mental cruelty which will here-
after be fully set out. The respondent denied the acts of 
cruelty alleged by the appellant and filed a counter claim 
charging the appellant with acts of cruelty toward the re-
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spondent and praying for a divorce and property settlement 
and custody of the minor children. 
The issue being joined, the matter was tried before the 
court sitting without a jury. The court found the issues on 
the cause of divorce in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiff and entered his findings in accordance therewith. 
The court made a property settlement on an alleged oral stipu-
lation dictated into the record by the attorneys for the parties 
and divided the property along the lines of said stipulation. 
Two of the minor children having married during the pendency 
and trial of the action the matter of custody became moot and 
the court did not pass thereon. The custody of the other 
minor child was not fixed by the court for the reason that he 
had joined the army and was serving with the armed forces at 
the time the decree was entered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in Ogden, Utah on May 20, 
1919. Each party had been an actual and bona fide resident 
of Weber County for more than three months immediately 
prior to the commencement of the action. Eight children 
have been born as the result of said union. At the time of 
filing said complaint three of the children were minors. During 
the pendency of the action, Barbara was married. During trial 
Charlby was married and Charus went in the armed services 
of the United States. 
Appellant alleges that the respondent is addicted to the 
excessive use of intoxicating liquor. She testified, T. 3, that 
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he used two or three fifths a day on an average. Sometimes 
three or four per day to treat his friends. That "He was drunk 
every night for three months" T. 3. Appellant took nine 
liquor permits out of respondent's shirt pockets (Exhibit A) 
T. 3. He had additional permits. 
"He has a box full of them, like a deck of cards." 
As the Gas Sav Station where respondent works, she 
discussed the matter with him and respondent said, "Didn't 
give a Goddam. I got one liquor permit. I will get someone 
else to get another." T 3. 
Respondent did not start drinking until parties moved 
to Clearfield fifteen or sixteen years ago and not excessively 
until the respondent started to work for Gas Sav. T. 4. Re-
spondent drank heavily for about last five years and came home 
intoxicated every night or every second night. T. 5. 
"This is the first time I have seen him sober for years, is 
right now." T. 5. 
When under the influence of intoxicating liquor "he was 
just like he had a drug on him. He was like a <;:razy man who 
threatened to kill you, choke you, he put me out doors." T. 5. 
About four years ago the parties were up in Weber Canyon 
celebrating the return of their son Arnold from the army. Mr. 
Rackham was dancing with Mrs. Welker, who had been drink· 
ing with him on a prior occasion. T. 7. Mrs. Rackham walked 
to her and said, 
"Young lady, why do you want to flirt with my husbandl 
He has eight children." 
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Mrs. Welker said, "You dirty Son of a Bitch, I have got . 
five children of my own." Mrs. Welker indicated if Mrs. Rack-
ham was not wearing glasses she would knock her face in. Mrs. 
Rackham grabbed her by the arms and pushed her against the 
wall and said, 
"You leave my husband alone." T. 7. Mr. Rackham 
called Mrs. Rackham vile and obscene names, T. 8., and in 
the presenc~ of a large crowd tore off her clothes. T. 8. 
Mrs. Rackham had been working on an apartment to get 
it ready for renting. Coming home late, Mr. Rackham 
"smacked" her in the face, knocked her glasses across the room 
and injured the nerve above her eyebrow. She has often had 
to have treatment at the doctor's. T. 9. Called her vile 
names, accused her of improper conduct. T. 9. 
At the Gas Sav Station, l\1r. Rackham took Mrs. Rack-
ham's purse. He was going to drive away with it. She tried 
to reach in the truck to get the purse. He twisted her arm. 
She testified "he smacked my head against the iron on the 
car door, injuring the vertebra of my neck, and pushed me 
out without giving me my purse." T. 10. He took the key 
to her safety deposit box and other things valuable to him. 
T. 11. 
Mrs. Rackham had saved money and put it in an old 
phonograph. She told Mr. Rackham that she wanted to build 
a home with the money. She was seven and a half months 
along with a baby. He fought with Mrs. Rackham at this 
time. He weighed 225 lbs. He stood on Mrs. Rackham and 
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jumped up and down and choked her and she lost the baby. 
The baby was born dead. T. 12. 
:Mr. Rackham threw a chromium chair at Mrs. Rackham 
and missed her. He called her vile names. T. 13. 
On May 16th 1\frs. Rackham wanted Mr. Rackham to 
take her to tt'le dance to celebrate their wedding anniversary. 
Mr. Rackham came home drunk. She tried to fix him up with 
cold packs. He did not revive. Mrs. Rackham went to the 
dance with her son and his wife. On returning home she 
had to knock on the door to get in. Mr. Rackham grabbed her 
by the dress, calling her obscene names. Mrs. Rackham ran 
into the hall to the room where son Arnold was. Arnold pro-
tected her. The next morning she sued for divorce. T. 15. 
Mrs. Rackham desired to buy a house from a real estate 
man, Leland Gibbs. He showed her the house and she was 
driving to his home when they encountered Mr. Rackham 
driving his truck on the highway. Mrs. Rackham _§topped her 
car. Mr. Rackham stopped and came over to Mrs. Rackham's 
car with a crank in his hand. She locked the door from the 
inside. She tried to drive away but he drove right into the 
side of her car with his truck. T. 16. 
On several occasions, Mr. Rackham called renters of Mrs. 
Rackham vile and obscene names. T. 16, 17. 
About three years ago on the 24th of July, Mr. Rackham 
took Mrs. Rackham, Ida Grasenti, Angelo Grasenti and Fannie 
Dellamore to Idaho in his truck. They stopped at Ida Grasenti' s 
father's home. Mrs. Rackham was assisting in the preparation 
of a meal. Ida's mother called something in Italian and Ida 
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came in and slapped Mrs. Rackham's face. This "tickled" Mr. 
Rackham "to death." Mr. Rackham put Mrs. Rackham's arm 
over his shoulder and pulled her and broke her arm. T. 19. 
About five years ago the appellant was in the bathroom. 
The respondent came home drunk and broke the bathroom door 
in thinking someone was with Mrs. Rackham. T. 21. 
Respondent sang filthy songs in the presence of the minor 
children. T. 22. 
About seven months ago Mr. Rackham came home about 
1: 30 in the morning. He rang the front door bell. Mrs. 
Rackham got up to let him in. He used vile language, told 
her to get out of the house. She went out in the car then 
went to the police station. Two officers returned with her. 
Mr. Rackham used vile language. One policeman struck Mr. 
Rackham under the heart. Mr. Rackham took $148.00 out 
of Mrs. Rackham's purse. She was afraid of him and spent 
the night at her sister's. T. 23. 
Respondent chased appellant out of her home when he 
was drunk, called her obscene names. T. 24. 
About a year ago respondent ordered her out of the house 
in her bare feet in the winter time. T. 24. 
On Mr. Rackham's birthday in August 1946, Mrs. Rack-
ham gave him a big birthday party. All the sons and their 
wives were there. She had a big birthday cake. He came 
home drunk and called them "dirty sons of bitches" and they 
said, "Oh, Dad, you are just drunk. Mrs. Rackham took a 
piece of birthday cake to him and he ate it and vomited. T. 26. 
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On several occasions Mr. Rackham has been so ill from 
drinking that the doctor had to be called. T. 26. 
Respondent's treatment of appellant has caused her great 
physical and mental suffering and distress. T. 26, 27. Mrs. 
Rackham further 'testified that last year before the complaint 
was filed she went to try and get Mr. Rackham to come home 
as Chams was joining the Boy Scouts or National Guard. Mr. 
Rackham said, "The reason he is joining the National Guard 
is because of your actions, because you are such a G- D-
Son of a B--. T. 29. 
On three or four occasions, 11r. Rackham did not come 
home all night. "He met some friends and was drinking and 
gambling." T. 29. 
This is the fourth time appellant has filed divorce against 
respondent. T. 29. 
~Mrs. Rackham made $800.00 renting bathing suits at the 
Hermitage. She wanted to build a home, told Mr. Rackham 
and he struck her and broke her nose. T. 3 5. 
Edward A. Johnstone, the custodian of the sales slips 
of Utah Liquor Control" Commission, testified that purchases 
of whiskey were made on permit No. 50083 issued to Clarence 
Rackham, 2300 Lincoln, T. 404, in January 1947 in the amount 
of $99.31, February $77.98, March $120.74, April $78.50, 
May $104.74 and June $81.78. One bottle of wine totaling 66 
cents is included. All the rest was whiskey. T. 408. 
The appellant has acquired a number of tracts of real 
property. In 1920 she purchased the first tract of land, being 
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a vacant lot, from Glen Vance for $300.00. She borrowed the 
money to pay for this property from her father. She built 
a basement, put in a foundation and constructed a home known 
as 2 3 5 36th Street on credit received from the Wheelwright 
Lumber Company. The parties lived in the property a short 
time and sold the same to appellant's father, J. A. Stephens 
for $2400.00. She paid the bills for construction of the house 
and had a few hundred dollars left. T. 113. 
In 1923 appellant purchased from Dr. Allen the property 
at 207 35th St. consisting of a two-room house and a lot facing 
Lincoln Street. Purchase price $1000.00. Two rooms were 
built on the house and the same was shingled. Rented two 
rooms for $18.00 per month. Years later the house was sold 
to John White for $1200.00. T. 114. 
About the same year the appellant built a house at 3506 
Lincoln Street. Three rooms were added and this property 
was sold in 1946 for $5000.00 to Ellen J. King. This property 
was completed in 1929. T. 115. Appellant got old bricks 
and. built the house and respondent did not know about it. 
T. 35. Rented three apartments for $100.00 per month and 
applied rentals on purchase of other property. T. 40. 
In 1929 Appellant purchased the property at 219 27th 
Street for $800.00 from Martha Hope. She obtained the 
money for this purchase from the sale of a car which she had 
accumulated from her earnings. She remodeled the property 
and rented it for $40.00 per month until 1933 or 1934 when 
she sold it to Mr. Fajuka for $3200. T. 116. 
Mr. Rackham mortgaged the property at 3506 Lincoln 
10 
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Street for $1500.00 and used the money for his own purposes. 
T. 116. 
In 1931 appellant purchased the property at 2703 Wall 
from Federal Building & Loan Association for $295.00, $50.00 
down and $10.00 per month. Two rooms were remodeled and 
Mr. Rackham put shingles on the back part of the house. This 
portion has leaked for three years. T. 117, 118. 
In 1932 appellant purchased the property at 128 27th 
Street and 132 27th Street. On 128 was located an old frame 
two-story house which appellant rented to colored people. 
132 had an old two-story adobe house which she rented to 
colored people. Purchase price for the two properties was 
$1600.00. 128 27th Street was sold to John Newbill. 132 
27th Street was sold to a colored lady for $7000.00. T. 118. 
Appellant purchased this property while respondent was away 
and fixed it up. 
In 1934-35 purchased 158 27th Street from an Italian 
woman for $1800.00. A small down payment was made and 
the balance was paid from rentals. The property was remodeled 
into six apartments. Mr. Rackham did none of the remodel-
ing. The place was sold for $3500.00 and is one of the escrows 
now held by Commercial Security Bank. T. 119, 120. 
In 1934 or 35 appellant purchased the property at 2727 
Lincoln Street consiting of a three-story brick building with 
a barn in the rear for $1800.00. The front building was 
remodeled into 11 apartments and the barn into one. She 
sold the property was $11,000.00 but only received $400.00. 
The property is now being rented for $200 per month. T. 120. 
11 
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In 193 7 appellant purchased property at 2733 Grant 
Avenue from Mr. McGuire for $1800.00, $300.00 down and 
the balance in installments. Th~s property was remodeled into 
six unit apartments. She sold this property in 1946 to Mr. 
Schrood for $3000.00. She purchased $4000.00 face value 
war bonds with the money. T. 121. 
In 1941 appelant purchased 2725-2727 Grant Avenue from 
Thomas Wilson for $5300 cash. T. 122. Mrs. Rackham got 
the money to pay for this property out of her safety deposit 
box at First Security Bank. She still has this property. T. 123. 
In 1943 appellant purchased the Riverdale property for 
$6700.00. She took $1700.00 from the joint savings account 
of the appellant and respondent from the Commercial Securitj 
Bank. She took $2500.00 out of her safety deposit box at 
Commercial Security Bank and the balance of $2500.00 she 
obtained from other sources belonging to her. T. 124. 
In May 1946 appellant purchased twelve $1000.00 face 
value war bonds. T. 127. 
In June 1946 appellant purchased five $1000.00 war 
bonds. T. 129. 
In June 1947, appellant purchased the property at 1814 
South West Temple Street, Salt Lake City, for the sum of 
$8000.00 for the house and $500.00 for the furniture. She 
cashed ten war bonds and paid the $7500.00 plus $1000.00 
in cash. T. 71, 72. 
Purchased property at 2639 Lincoln Street from Mr. 
Frank. Four room brick house with bath between which she 
remodeled into two apartments. She fixed everything up 
12 
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herself and rented the property for $20.00 for each side. She 
paid for this property out of rentals. T. 44, 45. 
The appellant purchased the furniture in her home at 334 
Riverdale Road herself. T. 55. 
Appellant purchased furniture for 2725 fnd 2727 Grant 
herself. T. 56. 
Appellant bought a 1941 Chevrolet Deluxe for $865.00. 
The appellant acquired a total of thirty one $1000.00 face 
value war bonds, the money for which came from rentals 
and sale of property which she had acquired. T. 60. 
"In addition to the labor mentioned, the appellant lathed 
the house clear through, eight rooms ,ceilings, walls and every-
thing. Lathed the house at 3506 Lincoln eight rooms. The 
one at 2703 Wall she lathed and built a little breakfast room 
out of cement, carried rocks on a wheelbarrow, put the rocks 
in cement and dug a basement at 2506 Lincoln and handled 
the brick for this house at 2506 Lincoln and carried the mortar 
for the bricklayers, put in all the brick at Riverdale and lathed 
the house." T. 65. 
The respondent alleges that the appellant since the month 
of October 1946 has been consorting and at times living with 
one LeGrande Jolley, a married man at the time:~£ the com-
mencement of this action; that the appallant has made fre-
quent trips to Park City and Salt Lake City to see said· Jolley 
and spent nights with him; T. 212; and that she remained 
away from home night after night and usually over the week 
ends in his company; that the appellant purchased a house in 
house in Salt Lake City and furnished the same and lived 
13 
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there at least part of the time in one of the said house with 
the said Jolley and in the same bedroom with him. To sustah 
this allegation and finding, the respondent produced the testi-
mony of William Birk, a private detective, who testified that 
on October 8, 1947, some five months after the commencement 
of this action, he observed the appellant in the basement at 
814 South West Temple Street with Mr. Jolley. In looking 
into the basement from an outside window, he testified, "Well, 
I could see the whole basement. It is like looking into a place 
like this except normal obstructions such as a stove, they had 
regular housekeeping. More or less it looked like a temporary 
setup. I could only see one bed and I remained there." The 
witness further testified that the parties were preparing a meal 
and eating the same; that he remained until "about a quarter 
of twelve, I suppose, before the light went out." T. 185. "The 
last thing I saw was darkness, but I was concerned with the 
fact of whether Mrs. Rackham or Jolley left the basement, 
which they did not. I could only see one bed, that is all I 
saw." T. 186. 
The witness further testified that he returned on Friday, 
October 10, to 814 South West Temple and that "Mr. Jolley 
and J\1rs. Rackham that evening had gone to a show and had 
called on a sister on the way home. They returned home at 
9:30 or 10 o'clock, somewhere in the nighborhood, and again 
had dinner. She prepared the dinner, and while she prepared 
the dinner, he had a few tours of looking around with a 
flashlight. I don't know what he was looking for in the base-
ment, perhaps fixing something. Again I stayed there and 
observed the thing until the lights went out, and neither one 
14 
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of them left the place. It was around 12:00 o'clock or 12:30." 
T. 186. 
The respondent testified of having seen Mr. Jolley repair-
ing a roof on one of the appellant's properties in Ogden. 
T. 212. 
Arnold, the son of appelant and respondent, testified that 
he drove to Salt Lake City and spent the night with his mother 
and Jolley in the basement at 814 South West Temple Street. 
That he slept with Jolley in one bed and his mother slept in 
another bed. T. 390. 
The respondent testified that the appellant in 1943 ad-
mitted indiscretions with one Rich, and that she told him two 
of her children were not his. T. 278, 279. 
The other matters of cruelty on which the respondent 
relies are that the appellant made all manner of false accusa-
tions against him of every imaginable wrong, calls him vile 
names, screams at him in a shrill and shrewish voice, slaps 
him and beats him on the head and body. T. 264. At the 
conclusion of the testimony, the attorney for the appellant 
and respondent dictated an oral stipulation setting out a pro-
posed property settlement between the parties. T. 42 5. 
The appellant in testifying about the purported stipulation 
said, "I didn't feel right about it because he never did nuthin' 
to help me accumulate what I got." T. 431. 
Appellant's counsel reported to the court that he dictated 
a stipulation the copy of which was submitted to Mrs. Rackham 
but that he was ~ever authorized to submit it to the court by 
her. T. 434. 
15 
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Appellant's counsel· reports to the court that the appellant 
requires a ·short time in which the study the situation referring 
to the stipulation. T. 435. 
Thereafter, on March 31, 1949, appellant's counsel re-
ports that "we express our willingness to abide by the stipula-
lation." T. 439. 
Later appellant's counsel says, "Well, there are a lot of 
things we won't stipulate." T. 44?. 
Appellant's counsel further reports that the last stat~ment 
made to the court in the case, "I want Mrs. Rackham thoroughly 
satisfied so that she will feel I have done what I could for her." 
No written stipulation was ever prestented to the court nor 
did Mrs. Rackham personally ever consent to be bound by the 
terms of the stipulation. 
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR 
1. The court erred in failing to award a decree of divorce 
to the plaintiff. 
2. The court erred in awarding a divorce to the defendant 
when there was insufficient evidence to support the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law as made by the trial judge. 
3. The court erred in unjustly and inequitably dividing the 
property of plaintiff and defendant. 
4. The court erred in basing an award of the property 
on a stipulation which was not in writing and which the 
/plaintiff never consented to. 
16 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD A 
DECREE OF DIVORCE TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Years ago this court committed itself to a rule which 
has been termed by many "the rule of chivalry" which holds 
that in divorce matters where the wife is seeking a divorce 
on the grounds of cruelty, the court will require less evidence 
than if the husband is seeking a divorce on the grounds of 
cruelty. 
"On the record we are persuaded that the prepon-
derance of the evidence shows that the plaintiff, for a 
number of years was guilty of nagging and faultfind-
ing. But each spouse must expect some of that, es-
pecially the husband, who, being the stronger, ought 
to take and forebear much of it with patience. 
"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the ground 
of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much less evi-
dence than they do the husband. That rests on sound 
principles, for acts and (:Onduct on the part of a husband 
may well constitute cruelty to the wife causing her 
great mental distress, when similar acts and condt.iCl 
on her part may not constitute cruelty to him, or cause 
him great mental distress. Before a decree is granted 
the husband on such ground, it ought to be a somewhat 
aggravated case." 
-Doe v. Doe, 158 P. 781. 
The above quotation is recited in Hyrup v. Hyrup, 245 
P. 335; Johnson v. Johnson, 152 P2nd at 428; and Cordner 
v. Cordner, 61 P2nd 601. 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There are a number ·of separate allegations of cruelty 
made by the appellant which are either admitted by the testi-
mony of the respondent directly or his answers are such that 
the only reasonable inference one can draw is an admission 
of the allegations. 
The appellant testified that the respondent came home 
drunk, rang the front door bell, that she was in the bath tub, 
she couldn't get out in time and that the respondent almost 
broke the front door in and came into the house and broke 
the bathroom· door in thinking someone was in the bathroom 
with her. T. 21. 
The respondent testified that the appellant locked the 
door and that it was locked by a little slide latch, that he leaned 
against the door and just splintered a little piece of wood. 
T. 259, 260. 
The appellant testified that she told the respondent that 
she had $800.00 and desired to build a home. The respondent 
struck her and broke her nose. T. 35. 
The respondent testified that he was driving a car and 
that the appellant started to strike him and that he put up his 
arm to keep her from hitting him and that she got a bloody 
nose "she hit her own nose herself and that is all she got." 
In response to a question by his counsel, "Was it broken?" 
he replied, "No, she never complained of it being broken 
until the last few years." T. 249. 
The appellant testified that at a party at the Hermitage 
when she made objections to the respondent flirting with 
another woman that he had become incensed at her and in 
18 
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the presence of a large crowd of people tore off her dress. 
T. 7, 8. 
The respondent in describing this incident testified that 
his wife had on a black velvet dress with a pin, that he grabbed 
her and she jerked away and tore a piece not over two or three 
inches in jerking away. T. 249, 250. 
The appellant describes an incident m which the re-
spondent came home about seven months prior to the filing 
of the divorce at 1 : 30 in the morning and using vile language 
ordered her out of the house, that she had to get out of the 
house, and that she went and called the police at the police 
station and upon returning found that the respondent had 
taken $148.00, which she had saved for taxes, out of her 
purse. T. 22, 23. 
The respondent testified that he had information that 
the appellant had taken the war bonds and that on confronting 
her with the question whether or not they were still in the 
safety deposit box she testified that they were. Whereupon, 
he grabbed her purse and found a bank book and receipt where 
she had turned all the bonds to Mr. Wilson and she called 
the officers. He admits taking $48.00 and some other stuff 
from the purse. T. 261, 262. 
The appellant testified that she had saved some money in 
an old phonograph and informed respondent she desired to 
build a house with this money. At that time she was about 
seven and a half months along with a baby, that the respondent 
wanted the money she had and fought with her, stood on her, 
jumped up and down and poked her until "I lost the baby 
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-from it, disconnected. the cord from the afterbirth and the 
baby smothered to death" and later the child was born dead. 
The respondent denies the occurrence outlined in this para-
graph, but in response to a question relating to the occurrence, 
"Did anything of that sort ever happen," answered "Abso-
lutely not. She did lose a child, but it was no fault of mine.'' 
T. 253. 
The appellant testified that in August of 1946 she gave 
the respondent a birthday party. She had all of her sons and 
their wives there. She made a big cake and wanted to show 
him a good time on his birthday. He came home drunk and 
called them "dirty sons of bitches and everything" and they 
said, "Oh, Dad, you are just drunk." He went to bed drunk 
and the appellant took him in a piece of birthday cake. He 
sat and ate it and then vomited it and soiled the linen on the 
bed. T. 26. 
The respondent testified that he came home on his birth-
day in August 1946, that he had had "a few drinks with the 
boys on my birthday. We had some kids down at the house 
and we sat· around friendly awhile and then I went to bed. 
Question, "Did you vomit?" Answer, "No, sir. If I did, I 
didn't do it and I never have as far as in the bedroom or in 
bed is concerned." T. 263. 
Appellant testified about two years ago respondent took 
her in his truck. When she said she was going with him that 
he twisted her arm, called her vile names and drove up the 
dugway in U intah and turned the lights out, that she threw 
his hat out the window and she had an opportunity to get out 
of the truck and get away from the respondent. T. 27. 
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The respondent testified that, "She went with me one 
night when I came home and she started saying 'it's just a habit 
of gratifying you, so I want to leave.' She got in the Ford 
pickup and refused to get out, so I drove out there somewheres, 
I don't recall where it was, and she got out of the truck and 
I went off and left her." T. 264. 
Appellant relates an incident in which respondent ordered 
her out of the house in the winter time in her bare feet. T. 23, 24. 
Respondent, in response to a question, "Did anything of 
that kind occur?" answered, "No, that was just about a year 
ago when she went out to one of the neighbors and called 
these officers." Question, "She was in her bare feet then?" 
Answer, "Well, I don't recall." T. 263. 
The appellant relates an incident when she went to the 
Gas Sav Station that the respondent took her purse and got 
into his truck, that she tried to reach over him to get the purse 
and that he twisted her arm, knocked her head against the side 
of the truck and injured her vertebra. T. 10. 
The respondent categoricaly denies this incident, but in 
response to a question, "At any other time have you ever twisted 
her arm or smacked her head against the door or injured her 
vertebra?" replied, "At one time she went to a chiropractor." 
T. 252. 
The appellant relates an incident when she and Mr. Rack-
ham, Ida Grasenti, Angelo Grasenti, and Fannie Delamore 
went to Rupert, Idaaho in a truck. They visited at the home 
of Ida Grasenti's father. While appellant was assisting in 
the kitchen with Ida's mother, Ida slapped her. Mrs. Rackham 
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came out on the lawn where her husband was and she reported 
the girl had slapped her and "it tickled him to death. Clarence 
put my arm over his shoulder and pulled it and broke it right 
there." Question, "Clarence broke your arm?" Answer, "Yes, 
and called me everything in front of the whole bunch." T. 19. 
The respondent in relating the incident admitted that she 
did get kicked and hit but said he did not see it. He denied 
breaking her arm, but testified, "She tried to pull away from 
me. I had hold of her arm, let's see, it would be this arm 
(indicating left arm) and her back and I made her come with 
me; I had one arm around her and tried to make her get in 
the truck. She tried to resist and go back, I made her get in 
the truck." T. 258. 
The appellant relates that for the past five years the 
respondent has used intoxicating liquors to excess. She has 
introduced in evidence (Exhibit A) a number of liquor permits 
which she took from the respondent's possession and has 
testified that the respondent came home every night or second 
night either drunk or under the influence of intoxicating 
liquors. T. 3 and 4. 
Respondent admits that he takes a social drink occasionally 
with friends both at his place of business and at his home, and 
further indicates that when working around the place, he 
takes a few "pulls." T. 246, 247. 
Edward A. Johnston, a custodian for the Liquor Control 
commission, testified as to the amount of whisky purchased on 
the one license (Exhibit H) issued amounted to $564.05 in 
the first six months of 1947. T. 408. 
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In response to a question asked by appellant's counsel to 
respondent, "You called her a whore on different occasions, 
haven't you?" answered, "Well, I don't know as I called her 
that in them words." Question, "Well, you wouldn't say you 
haven't would you?" Answer, "Well, I don't recall it." T. 297. 
From the testimony quoted the court can see that the 
- respondent had pursued a course of mental and physical cruelty 
against the appellant for a long period of time which had. 
caused her both physical and mental suffering and distress. 
Point 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A DIVORCE 
TO THE DEFENDANT WHEN THERE WAS INSUF-
FICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS MADE BY THE 
TRIAL JUDGE. 
Where the respondent has made charges against the ap~ 
pellant of such a nature as to injure the social standing of the 
appellant and bring her into disrepute, the charges must be 
sustained by convincing proof. 
The respondent has charged the appellant with adultery 
with one LeGrande Jolley. The only proof adduced in support 
of this charge is the testimony of William Birk, a private 
detective, who saw the appellant and LeGrande Jolley on 
October 8th and lOth, 1947, above five months after the filing of 
the complaint and answer and counter claim. He testified that 
he saw them in an apartment owned by the appellant in the 
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evening of October 8th and 1Oth preparing a meal, then about 
12:00 o'clock the lights were put out and that he remained until 
about 12:30. T. 185, 186. 
There is no indication of any indiscretion by the appellant, 
and the son of the appellant and respondent, Arnold Rackham, 
testified that LeGrande Jolley had performed certain work 
on the properties of the appellant in Salt Lake City and in 
Ogden. That he came to Salt Lake City with his mother and 
that they stayed in the basement of the apartment owned by 
her and that LeGrande Jolley slept in the basement in a 
separate bed. T. 390. 
The respondent testified that he had seen LeGrande 
Jolley repairing a roof on one of the buildings owned by the 
appellant and indicated that he wanted to shake hands with 
LeGrande Jolley. T. 212. The actions of respondent on 
this occasion indicate he had no ill feelings toward LeGrande 
Jolley or that he suspected him of having any improper rela-
tions with. Mrs. Rackham. 
The evidence adduced of indiscretions with one Harry 
Woods indicates that the said Woods lived in an apartment 
rented by Mrs. Rackham from September or October until 
after Christmas 1942. T. 412. That sometime in the fall 
of 1943, T. 411, Harry Woods and another man accompanied 
Mrs. Rackham to Tremonton where she had business with an 
automobile dealer, that Mr. Rackham followed and saw the 
parties in an automobile together. T. 238, 240. No indis-
cretion or overt acts were testified to by Mr. Rackham. 
Prior to 1943 he saw the appellant with one Lynn Gibbs 
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m appellant's automobile; that Gibbs had his head on ap-
pellant's lap; that when he drove up, Mrs. Rackham locked 
the car from the inside. Later Gibbs got out of the car and 
ran through the fields according to Mr. Rackham's testimony. 
T. 241. 
Mr. Rackham testified about one Ed Stevenson, some 
time between 1931 and 1932. He testified that he saw the 
appellant and Ed Stevenson come out of the Ben Lomond 
Hotel at 12:30 A.M.; that later the appellant received some 
letters signed Ed; and that on one occasion, Ed Stevenson 
came to their home when Mrs. Rackham was away and asked 
Mr. Rackham if Mrs. Rackham was present. No overt acts 
between the parties were testified to by Mr. Rackham. T. 233, 
237. 
Mr. Rackham further testified that Mrs. Rackham in 1943 
asked him to return home, as he had been living separately, 
because they had been married in the temple and the children 
needed them. He says that Mrs. Rackham told him about her 
relations with Harry Woods, Ed Stevenson and other men and 
promised to put the real property in joint tenancy or to give 
one-half of the property to Mr. Rackham, that after hearing 
all of the purported confessions he went back to live with :i\frs. 
Rackham as her husband and resumed the marital relation-
ship. T. 265. 
Certainly if any improper conduct was engaged in by Mrs. 
Rackham with any of the three persons mentioned, such con-
duct occurred prior to 1943 and the respondent, by resuming 
the marital relationship, condoned all of these acts. This 
leaves us with the bare allegations of mental cruelty and the 
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aireged indiscretions with LeGrande Jolley occurring some 
five months after the divorce was at issue. 
The appellant maintains that a reading of the evidence 
will disclose that the respondent failed to maintain the burden 
required where adultery is charged. Our supreme court in 
the case of Doe vs. Doe, supra, holds that a mere opportunity 
to commit adultery is not enough to show commission of it 
and in Holm vs. Holm, 139 Pacific 93 7, the court holds that 
a charge of adultery must be sustained by clear and satisfactory 
proof. Certainly the respondent has failed to satisfy the 
requirements of proof to sustain the allegations that the ap-
pellant was guilty of committing adultery with LeGrande 
Jolley. 
Point 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN UNJUSTLY AND INEQUIT-
ABLY DIVIDING THE PROPERTY OF PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT. 
A careful perusal of the testimony will disclose that the 
appellant has a sagacity in investing money in marginal real 
estate and repairing and remodeling the same so that the 
real estate is made to yield substantial returns. She shows 
the ability to save money and to realize the greatest amount 
possible in the sale of real estate. She had acquired the various 
properties listed in the findings of fact and the decree. The 
court should have followed the pattern set out in the case of 
Foreman vs. Foreman, 176 Pacific 2nd 144, at 152 in which this 
court said, 
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"With regards to amount of award, each case goes 
on its m-;n facts. The elements to be taken into con-
sideration by the court as governing its discretion in 
coming to a conclusion as to a property settlement are: 
( 1) The amount and kind of property owned by each 
of the parties. 
( 2) Whether the property was his before coverture 
or accumulated jointly. 
( 3) The ability and opportunity of each to earn 
money. 
( 4) The financial condition and necessities of each 
party. 
( 5) The health of the parties. 
( 6) The standard of living of the parties. 
(7} The duration of the marriage. 
( 8) What the wife gave up by the marriage. 
(9} What age they were married. 
This case followed the reasoning in Pinion vs. Pinion, 
67 Pacific 2nd 265. The court did not take into consideration 
elements 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 or 9 set out as guides to the court in 
making determinations of property rights between the parties. 
Where there is an appeal on the contention that the division 
of property by the trial court was unjust and not supported 
by the evidence, such contention makes it necessary for the 
Appellate Court to review the evidence bearing upon these 
matters and to give its judgment thereon. Openshaw vs. 
Openshaw, 12 Pacific 2nd 364, at 365 and 366, citing with 
approval Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 292 Pacific 214 and later 
enunciated in the case of Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 63 Pacific 
2nd 277 at 279. 
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In determining whether or not the trial court has abused 
its discretion, Hampton vs. Hampton, 47 Pacific 2nd 419 says, 
"The above case and cases therein cited likewise establish the 
rule that it is not necessary for this court to find a gross abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court before modifying 
the judgment as to alimony. Such certainly is the rule also 
with respect to an award of the division of property. This 
court has indicated that the wife "if she had helped to 
accumulate part of his fortune, she would ordinarily be en-
titled to a substantial portion, at least of that. which she aided 
in accumulating depending upon all the circumstances attending 
the accumulation. Pinion vs. Pinion, 67 Pacific 2nd 265. 
In making a property settlement in this case, it is ap-
parent that the trial court gave no weight as to which of the 
parties had accumulated the property, but made its determi-
nation on the· mistaken basis that an oral stipulation had been 
agreed upon by the parties. 
Point 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING AN AWARD OF 
THE PROPERTY ON A STIPULATION WHICH WAS 
NOT IN WRITING AND WHICH THE PLAINTIFF 
NEVER CONSENTED TO. 
The rule is almost universal that an attorney who is clothed 
with no other authority than that arising from his employ-
ment in that capacity has no implied power by virtue of his 
general retainer to comprise and settle his client's claim or 
cause of action. 5 Am. Juris. 318, Citing Cases. 
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The implied authority of an attorney to make stipulations 
is ordinarily limited to matters of procedure in the management 
or prosecution of the action, in the absence of special authority 
any stipulation which operates as a surrender of the substan-
tial rights of ~~e client will not be upheld by the courts. Am. 
Juris. Vol. 5, P. 315. 
. . . And since an attorney may not act generally for 
his client, a stipulation for a disposition of the client's prop-
erty is not binding unless expressly authorized. Woerner v. 
Woerner (Calif.), 15 2 Pac. 919, Bancroft Code Practice, Page 
59, Vol. 1. 
Attorney cannot himself settle or compromise his client's 
claim and enter judgment accordingly or bind his client by an 
act which amounts to a complete or partial surrender of a 
substantial right. Bancroft Code Practice, Page 68, Vol. 1. 
Jubilee Placer Co. v. Hofffield, 50 P 716; Turner v. Fleming, 
130 P. 551 (2 RCL P 995). 
Appellant's counsel dictated a proposed property settle-
ment into the record which proposed a division of the property 
of the parties on an approximately fifty-fifty basis. T. 425. 
Appellant was not satisfied with the proposed settlement and 
her counsel indicated she needed additional time to consider 
the same. T. 435. 
Respondent's counsel represented in respect to the stipu-
lation as follows: "It is to be reduced to writing and presented 
to Your Honor as the values are fixed and the court will 
approve it." T. 426. Appellant's counsel in addressing the 
court relative to the stipulation, "I submitted one to Mrs. 
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Rackham and was never authorized to submit it to you. She 
has never done it." T. 434. Appellant's counsel indicated 
that he would be bound by the terms of the oral stipulation. 
T. 439, but after making such statement indicated that there 
were many things he would not stipulate to. T. 443. 
The last statement of appellant's counsel indicates he had 
some misgivings about whether or not Mrs. Rackham had 
agreed to the stipulation. He said at the close of the case, "I 
want Mrs. Rackham thoroughly satisfied so that she will feel 
I have done what I could for her. T. 462. Mrs. Rackham 
did not enter into any written agreement for the division of 
the property of the parties nor did she ever orally consent 
in court to the stipulation dictated into the record by her then 
attorney. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that appellant's counsel 
had no express nor implied authority from his client to bind her 
in the stipulation for a property settlement, and as the trial 
court did not make an independent determination of the prop-
erty rights on the formula set out by this court, no legal 
determination of the parties' property rights has been made. 
Appellant respectively submits that this court should 
reverse the findings of the trial court and award the divorce 
to the plaintiff and instruct the trial court to take further testi-
mony on the question of the property rights of the parties so 
that an equitable and just division of the property can be made. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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GRANT MACFARLANE, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
